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CHINA, MODERNIZATION, AND SINO-UNITED STATES
TRADE: WILL CHINA SUBMIT TO
ARBITRATION?
The Communist takeover of mainland China following World
War II set the stage for a long, cold, and bitter period of foreign
relations between the United States and the People's Republic of
China (China). A thaw in this chilly state of affairs began in 1969
when President Nixon relaxed United States restrictions regulating
Sino-United States trade.' A new American position was in evi-
dence in 1971 when the United States objections to China's admis-
sion to the United Nations were set aside and "ping-pong
diplomacy" was initiated, culminating in President Nixon's visit to
China in 1972.2 A result of this historic visit was the Shanghai
Communique,3 which expressed a mutual desire by China and the
United States to normalize relations and resume trade.4 The re-
sumption of trade in the interim has been extraordinary, with the
actual volume of trade exceeding most predictions.'
1. See Lubman, Trade with the United States, in LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S FOR-
EIGN TRADE 220, 221 (V. Li ed. 1977).
2. Frankel, Nixon Arrives in Peking To Begin An 8-Day Visit- Met By Chou At Airport,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
3. For the text of the Shanghai Communique, see 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 435 (1972).
For a discussion of the Shanghai Communique, see id. at 419-40; U.S. DEP'T OF COM.,
OVERSEAS Bus. REP., TRADING WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1-2 (1973).
4. Id.
5. UNITED STATES TRADE WITH CHINA
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Exports Imports Total Balance
1971 0 4.9 4.9 -4.9
1972 63.5 32.4 95.9 31.1
1973 740.2 64.9 805.1 675.3
1974 819.1 114.7 933.8 704.4
1975 303.6 158.3 461.9 145.3
1976 149 202 351 -53
1977 188 203 391 -15
1978 450 950 1,400 500
V. Li & S. LUBMAN, Introduction to LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE at xv
(V. Li ed. 1977); 79 DEP'T STATE BULL. 18 (March 1979).
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On the evening of December 15, 1978, a joint Communique6
was released simultaneously in Washington and Beijing,7 announc-
ing that full normalization of diplomatic relations between the
United States and China would be implemented on January 1,
1979.8 The Communique announced that the two governments
6. Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the
United States of America and the People's Republic of China, January 1, 1979:
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed
to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January i, 1979.
The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Re-
public of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the
people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial
relations with the people of Taiwan.
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the
principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and emphasize
once again that:
-Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.
-Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific or in any other region of
the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries
to establish such hegemony.
-Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into
agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
-The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese
position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.
-Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in
the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause
of peace in Asia and the world.
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will ex-
change ambassadors and establish embassies on March 1, 1979.
79 DEP'T STATE BULL. 25 (Jan. 1979).
7. On January 1, 1979, China officially adopted the "pinyin" system of writing Chinese
characters in the Latin alphabet; subsequently the United States government also adopted
pinyin. A system of romanization invented by the Chinese, pinyin has been used extensively
for years in China on street signs and in elementary Chinese textbooks as an aid for West-
erners in learning Chinese characters. Pinyin is to replace the Wades-Giles romanization
system and will be used in this Comment. Words frequently used in this Comment are given







Chiang Ching Jiang Qing
Mao Tse-tung Mao Zedong
Teng Hsiao-ping Deng Xiaoping
Hua Kuo-Feng Hua Guofeng
Chou En-lai Zhou Enlai
Lin Piao Lin Biao
INDUS. & TRADE AD., U.S. DEP'T OF COM., DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA I (1979); NEWS-
WEEK, Feb. 5, 1979, at 38; Mathews, Proposed China Laws Challenged, L.A. Times, July 1,
1979, pt. I, at 1, col. 5.
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would exchange ambassadors and establish embassies on March 1,
1979.9 Thus, in a whirlwind turn of events, the world's wealthiest
nation and the world's most populous nation officially ended their
long enmity.
The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 has accelerated the increase
in China's foreign trade beyond most sinologists' expectations.' 0
Immediately following Mao's death, an internal political power
struggle took place within the Chinese Communist Party, pitting
the Radical faction, led by Mao's widow Jiang Qing, against the
Pragmatist faction and their spokesman Hua Guofeng. I I The
Radicals advocated isolationism, an end to foreign trading, and a
return to complete self-reliance; the Pragmatists, on the other hand,
called for a more progressive campaign to modernize China
through the increased importation of foreign technology.' 2 The
fierce contest ended in victory for the Pragmatists and China's cur-
rent Premier, Hua Guofeng.' 3 He and Vice Premier Deng Xiaop-
ing have, in the interim, embarked upon a de-Maoification of
China which has proceeded at a frenetic pace.14
China, long separated from the outer world by an "instinctive
xenophobia and an admixture of reclusive Maoism," began, in
1978, what Beijing called the "New Long March."' 5 The Chinese,
their economy sluggish and their morale exhausted by the disas-
trous Cultural Revolution,' 6 hope to arrive at a condition of rela-
tive modernity by the year 2000, and in the process become a world
economic and military power.'7 The motivating force behind this
campaign is Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping,'8 the principal architect
of what has become known in Chinese rhetoric as the "Four Mod-
ernizations" - an attempt to simultaneously improve agriculture,
industry, science and technology, and defense.' 9
9. L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 1978, pt. I, at 22, col. 1.
10. See TIME, Jan. 1, 1979, at 17.
11. Id.
12. Id.; Leslie, Mao Widow's Future Clouded, L.A. Times, Sept. 17, 1976, pt. I, at 1, col.
4.
13. Munro, Mao's Widow, 3 Shanghai Radicals Reported Heldfor Plotting a Coup, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 12, 1976, at 1, col. I; Appointment of Hua As Party's Chairman Confirmed By
Peking, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
14. TIME, Jan. 1, 1979, at 17.
15. Id. at 12.
16. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1969), directed against the onset of complacency
and bureaucracy, dislocated nearly every institution of Chinese life. Id. at 16.
17. Id. at 12.
18. Id.
19. Deng's modernization campaign has its origins in ex-Premier Zhou Enlai's report
on the work of government, delivered at the Fourth National People's Congress in 1975.
1980
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An important factor in the push for normalization was China's
desire to acquire American technology for her modernization
drive.2° Vice Premier Deng, in late January 1979, made an unprec-
edented eight-day visit to the United States.2 ' The twofold purpose
of the visit was to strengthen Sino-United States relations and to
provide Deng with a glimpse of the technology he covets for
China.22
Normalization did not eliminate all the barriers to Sino-
United States trade. Significant obstacles remained - in particu-
lar, the frozen assets-blocked claims dispute23 and the question of
granting most-favored-nation treatment to Chinese goods imported
into the United States.24 On May 11, 1979, China and the United
States signed an agreement settling the long-standing frozen assets-
blocked claims dispute, clearing the way for the signing of a Sino-
United States trade agreement.25 On July 7, 1979, a comprehensive
trade agreement was signed.26 The accord, if approved by Con-
gress, will provide most-favored-nation treatment for Chinese im-
ports.27 The trade agreement puts the United States on equal
footing with its trade competitors in Western Europe and Japan,
and is expected to provide an impetus to the development of bilat-
eral trade.28
A final concern in Sino-United States trade relations is the res-
olution of commercial disputes - the need for workable trade arbi-
tration mechanisms. In this area, American and Chinese
philosophies are at variance. Although international commercial
arbitration is currently the preferred method of settling interna-
That report and the Four Modernizations slogan are widely believed to have been the work
of Deng Xiaoping, who was at the time Zhou's prot6g. Id.
20. Mathews, U.S, China -the Ignorance Was Mutual, L.A. Times, Jan. 2, 1979, pt. I,
at 1, col. 1; US-China Ties Formally Established, L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 1979, pt. I, at 5, col. 1.
21. Kempster, TengArrives, is Greeted Quietly in Washington, L.A. Times, Jan. 29, 1979,
pt. I, at 1, col. 5.
22. In Atlanta, Deng was escorted by Henry Ford II through a nearby Ford Motor
plant. Texas provided a close look at some of the American technology Deng admires - a
visit was made to the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, and Deng toured the
Hughes Tool Company, one of the world's largest manufacturers of oil-drilling equipment.
In Seattle, Deng visited the Boeing aircraft plant; China has ordered three of Boeing's 747
jumbo jets. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 1979, at 27.
23. United States claims for property confiscated by the Chinese or abandoned after the
1949 revolution total $196.4 million. Chinese claims for assets seized by the United States
after the outbreak of the Korean War are estimated to be $80 million. Id. at 32.
24. Id.
25. U.S Signs Pact on China Claims, L.A. Times, May 1I, 1979, pt. I, at 9, ol. 3.
26. L.A. Times, July 8, 1979, pt. I, at 6, col. I.
27. Id.
28. See notes 250-65 infra, and accompanying text.
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tional trade disputes and is very popular with American business-
men,29 the Chinese have proven to be obsessively recalcitrant to
submit to arbitration, even when arbitration is provided for in a
business contract.3" This divergence must be reconciled to ensure
that trade disagreements will be handled equitably.
This Comment will examine the problems involved in negoti-
ating settlements of commercial disputes with China. As back-
ground to this problem, the historical, cultural, and ideological
factors underlying China's reluctance to arbitrate will be examined,
followed by a discussion of China's legal renaissance. This Com-
ment will then explore the development and current popularity of
arbitration in international commerce. Dispute settlement between
China and other countries will be examined to demonstrate China's
recent intention to avoid arbitration and to document foreign reac-
tion to the problems this recalcitrance has presented in resolving
disputes. The shift in Chinese political and economic philosophy
following Mao Zedong's death in 1976 - de-Maoficiation and
modernization - will then be examined, as will recent develop-
ments eliminating the longstanding barriers to trade. The manifes-
tations of these new philosophies will be analyzed as portents of
China's future. Finally, this Comment will demonstrate how
China's participation in arbitration is a logical extension of these
shifts in economic and political philosophy and one that will expe-
dite her goal of becoming a modern nation and a member of the
international business community.
I. HISTORIC INFLUENCES ON CHINESE DEVELOPMENT
A. China and the West
Modern international law is a creation of the West.3 ' The
early stages of the international legal system appeared in mid-sev-
enteenth century Europe in response to the needs of the new na-
tion-states that dominated the political and spiritual community.32
These nation-states developed a "balance of power" system which
prevented domination by any single power and which recognized
29. J. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (1978);
see also Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLuM. L. REV. 846, 850 (1961).
30. Li, Trade with China. An Introduction, in LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN
TRADE 12 (V. Li ed. 1977). Chinese practice is to avoid formal arbitration proceedings.
Even when the contract contains an arbitration clause and when a dispute has been un-
resolved for a duration, Chinese Foreign Trade Corporations (FTC) generally strive to settle
the dispute through "friendly discussions." INDUS. AND TRADE AD., supra note 7, at 14.
31. I J. COHEN & H. CHIL, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1974).
32. Id.
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the sovereign equality of all states. "As these dynamic nation-states
expanded their activities into East Asia, they discovered a civiliza-
tion, China, that had not experienced the Renaissance, the Refor-
mation, or other forces which had undermined the concept of a
universal state in Europe."33
China's first exposure to Western international law was during
the Ch'ing dynasty.34 Not until 1839 did China attempt to employ
international law as a method of resolving grievances with Euro-
pean nations.35 China, by relying on the publicist Vattel's Le Droit
des Gens36 and complying with the text's prescriptions,37 sought to
invoke international law to prevent British traders in Guangzhou
from smuggling opium into China.38 The attempt failed, however,
and the first Opium War (1839-1842) ensued, in part as a result of
China's compliance with, and reliance upon Le Droit des Gens.3 9
Britain's victory in the war resulted in China's coerced acquies-
cence to the first substantial Western presence in China.49
Following the first Opium War, Britain imposed the unequal
treaties system. For a century and a half prior to this, Guangzhou
had been the major Chinese market serving European merchants .4
In the ensuing years, other cities "were 'opened' to trade under co-
ercion, while China paid millions of dollars indemnity to England"
as a result of the war.42 "Imperialist powers claimed their conces-
sions and further encroached on China's coasts and river ports,"
dumping surplus goods that glutted the Chinese market and smug-
33. China had been insulated from the world beyond East Asia by mountains, deserts,
and oceans, as well as by an intense suspicion of "barbarians." Thus, China, whose name
means "the central realm," had presided over relations among the peoples of East Asia for
2,000 years according to its own concept of universal state. Id.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Id.
36. China's Imperial Commissioner Lin Tse-hsu learned of the existence of Vattel's Le
Droit des Gens (The Law of Nations) and persuaded an American missionary Dr. Peter
Parker and a Chinese man to translate some passages that pertained to China's plight. As
prescribed by Vattel, Commissioner Lin sent a letter to Queen Victoria to notify her of the
conduct of her offending nationals. His letter was never acknowledged. Id. at 6.
37. These passages acknowledged a state's right to stop foreign nationals from import-
ing noxious products into its territory. The state could declare those products to be contra-
band and could then effect their confiscation. Vattel prescribed that a state, before taking
such action against the offending foreign nationals, must notify their sovereign and request




41. Snow, China's Foreign Trade and Aid, II J. WORLD TRADE L. 101,102 (1977).
42. Id. at 102.
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gling the highly profitable opium into China. 3 Chinese economic
history, from 1842 until 1949, when the Communists emerged as
victors in the civil war, was marked by exploitation and humilia-
tion.44
This century of exploitation produced a general distrust of
Western law - skepticism that Western nations would apply inter-
national law in an evenhanded manner when dealing with China.45
This distrust had its impact on the revolutionary Chinese leaders
who took control of mainland China after the civil war; they
viewed Western law as a tool of subjugation and oppression.46
Western exploitation of China and China's negative experiences
with international law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries provides an historical foundation for China's present re-
luctance to participate in international arbitration. In addition to
the effect of economic history, Chinese legal tradition has also in-
fluenced China's reluctance to arbitrate foreign contract disputes.
B. China's Legal Tradition
Although Imperial China had developed and maintained a so-
phisticated legal system for more than a thousand years, "law did
not enjoy the prestige and importance that it gradually attained in
43. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Mandarins of Imperial China had trans-
lated Henry Wheaton's Elements ofInternational Law. Their eventual mastery of Western
doctrines and practices made them increasingly aware of the limited value of this legal
knowledge for a nation that lacked the military, political, and economic power to defend
itself. As one of China's early diplomats wrote in 1891: "International law is just like Chi-
nese statutory law - reasonable but unreliable. If there is right without might the right will
not prevail." COHEN & CHIU, supra note 31, at 10.
China has traditionally been introverted, suffering a foreign presence only when too
weak to resist. Nonetheless, China has felt the hunger to modernize before. In 1898, under
Emperor Kuang Hsu, the Chinese tried, unsuccessfully, to imitate Japanese Emperor Meiji's
nineteenth century transformation of Japan from feudalism to a modernized, Westernized
economy. Then in the early days of Sun Yat-sen's Republican China, an effort to streamline
Chinese society with foreign help failed miserably and eventually turned China toward puri-
tanical socialism. "The Chinese," wrote Historian C.P. Fitzgerald, "became disillusioned
with the false gods of the West. They turned restlessly to some other solution." TIME, Jan. 1,
1979, at 15.
44. Under these conditions, Britain and her colony Xianggang (Hong Kong), itself
wrestled from China in 1841, led the "free trade" with the "sleeping giant of the Far East."
At the beginning of World War I, Japan had acquired economic dominance over China. By
the end of World War II, the United States had assumed Japan's position. China's crum-
bling economy sank to dismal depths under civil war, bureaucratic and official corruption,
black markets, flight of capital - in the 1940s on the order of some $200 million annually -
and dissipation of national assets. Snow, supra note 41, at 103.
45. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 31, at 11.
46. Id. at 14.
7
Hinman: China, Modernization, and Sino-United States Trade: Will China Su
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1980
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Western societies."47 "In China, law was not regarded as a major
social achievement and a symbol of rectitude, but as a regrettable
necessity to be used by the state to enforce its will upon subjects
who refused to submit to alternative means of social control."4"
Many of the most fundamental concepts of Western legal thought
were never developed by the Chinese. Imperial China never de-
veloped a judiciary that was insulated from the political authority,
or an independent legal profession that strengthened the "law
habit," or a legal education system that articulated the idea of a
"rule of law."4 9 Historically, the Chinese have even rejected the
use of arbitration to resolve disputes, because it would impose a
solution that might result in "loss of 'face,'50 friendships, or advan-
tageous business relationships."'"
For centuries, Chinese society has been conditioned to abhor
law and litigation as a mechanism to obtain proper conduct and to
revere "moral rules" as the source of virtue in society.52 Chinese
social groups have "disposed of an enormous volume of potential
litigation using a variety of techniques rang[ing] from persuasion to
ostracism to coercion,"53 traditionally relying upon mediation and
the Confucian virtues of yielding and compromise for the resolu-
tion of disputes. 4
The Chinese Communists have continued the tradition of me-
diation, asserting that mediation is far superior to adjudication,
47. Id. at 17. For a discussion of law in traditional China, see generally D. BODDS & C.
MORRIS, LAW IN TRADITIONAL CHINA (1967).
48. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 31, at 17.
49. Id.
50. J. FAIRBANK, E. REISCHAUER & A. CRAIG, EAST ASIA 45-46 (1973). The Confucian
ideal was the chiun-tzu (gentleman), a cultivated or superior man. Confucius believed a "gen-
tleman" should possess the qualities of righteousness, an inner integrity, conscientiousness
toward others, altruism, and above all human-heartedness. Confucianism concentrated on
ethical tradition; an imposed solution would violate the ethical values of the system. Id.
51. McCobb, Foreign Trade Arbitration in the People's Republic of China, 5 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POL. 205, 207 (1972).
52. See Lee, Chinese Communist Law. Its Background and Development, 60 MICH. L.
REV. 439, 440-42 (1962).
53. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 31, at 17.
54. Before the Communists gained power, mediation had been the primary mode
of dispute settlement for thousands of years in traditional China. . . . Confucian-
ism, the dominant political philosophy in pre-Communist China, stressed the vir-
tues of compromise, yielding, and nonlitigiousness. The organization of the
imperial Chinese state, the operation of its governing institutions, and its traditional
social nuclei - family, clan, village, and guild - combined to create pressures and
institutions for extraj udicial mediation. The brief years of the Republic from 1911
to 1949 did not appreciably reduce the preference for mediation.
Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55 CALIF.
L. REV. 1284, 1285-86 (1967).
Vol. 10
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which they consider to be coercive.-- They have "continually ex-
tolled the virtues of mediation and claim to use it far more exten-
sively than adjudication in settling disputes."56
The Communists, however, have substantially altered the
traditional mode of mediating disputes." They have changed the
identity and role of mediators and "have partially succeeded in
transforming the process and functions of mediation."58 They have
"set themselves against the Confucian emphasis on compromise
and. . . they have infused into mediation absolute criteria of right
and wrong rather than allowing mediation to seek, as it once did, a
compromise that would not disrupt a delicate network of personal
relationships .... .""
The role of law6 0 in Communist China's "socialist transforma-
tion" has been very limited, reflecting the Marxist belief that law is
a tool of the ruling class.6 ' Indeed, much of China's domestic ori-
entation has been explicitly antilegal.62
In 1953, China began to adopt a "Soviet-style" legal system,63
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1286.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1287.
59. Id.
60. Two models of law have coexisted and competed with each other in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. One may be called thejural (formal) model, and the.other
the societal (informal) model. Reflecting Soviet and Western influence, the jural
model stands for formal, elaborate, and codified rules enforced by a centralized and
institutionalized bureaucracy. The societal model, on the other hand, focuses on
socially approved norms and values, implemented by political socialization and en-
forced by social pressures.
Leng, The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as Reflecting Mao Tse-tung's Influ-
ence, 68 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 356, 356-57 (1977). See generally Lee, supra note
52, at 440-49; J. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
1949-1963: AN INTRODUCTION (1968).
61. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 31, at 14. The class nature of law is an essential part of
Communist jurisprudence. Leng, supra note 60, at 363; see generally H. KELSEN, THE COM-
MUNIST THEORY OF LAW (1955).
Two concepts have conditioned the Chinese perception of the role of law in
their revolutionary scheme. One is the Marxist-Leninist theory that considers law
as a political tool to implement party policy. The other is Mao's idea of "uninter-
rupted revolution," that called for a continuous effort to mold and remold human
nature. These two conceptions have combined to provide the Chinese elites with a
theoretical framework to view law as an instrument of social engineering, to be
used for the transformation of Chinese society and its members in accordance with
the revolutionary ideology.
Leng, supra, note 60, at 366.
62. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 31, at 14.
63. Id. at 15. "As China adopted the Soviet style of economic development in 1953,
there was a swing toward institutionalization and bureaucratic normalization." Leng, supra
note 60, at 358.
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beginning the era of China's constitutional experiment. 64 This at-
tempt to adapt a Soviet legal model to Chinese conditions came to
an abrupt end in mid-1957 with the outbreak of the "anti-rightist"
movement, which dramatically reversed the previous trend toward
legal professionalism and some degree of judicial autonomy.65
A deformalization of the legal system followed,6 6 adopting
traditional mediation practices67 to settle disputes in accord with
revolutionary needs.68 Even this degree of deformalization did not
meet the radical antibureaucratic criteria of the Cultural Revolu-
tion. One of the targets of the Cultural Revolution was the existing
legal structure, which was labeled as counterrevolutionary.69 What
emerged from the Cultural Revolution was the ascendancy of the
"societal" model of law over the 'jural" model.70 Deformalization
of China's legal system continued until the death of Mao Zedong in
September 1976."t By then, China had arrived at an exceptional
degree of judicial simplicity,72 challenging the maxim of those soci-
ologists of law who have argued that "any state determined to
achieve a high level of industrialization must create a highly devel-
64. This period marked the ascendancy of the "jural" model of law and was character-
ized by the adoption of a constitution that guaranteed "equality before the law, right to legal
defense, protection against arbitrary arrest and independence of the judiciary," and a series
of substantive and procedural laws and regulations. "Efforts were also made to draft civil,
criminal, and procedural codes." Leng, supra note 60, at 358. For a discussion of China's
constitutional experiment, see COHEN, supra note 60, at 10-14.
65. Leng, supra note 60, at 358. In 1957, China's progress toward a stable legal order
ended when Communist elites launched the anti-rightest campaign. China had decided to
abandon the Soviet legal model in favor of Mao's strategy, the "Great Leap Forward." Id.;
COHEN, supra note 60, at 47.
66. Leng, supra note 60, at 359; COHEN & CHIu, supra note 31, at 15.
67. See notes 75-81 infra.
68. COHEN & CHIu, supra note 31, at 15.
69. Mao instigated the Cultural Revolution to revolutionize the bureaucratic establish-
ment. In an editorial entitled "In Praise of Lawlessness, the People's Daily called for the
destruction of the 'bourgeois' law so that the proletarian legal order could be established."
To transform the political-legal organs, Mao purged Yang Hsiu-feng, President of the
Supreme People's Court, Chang Ting-cheng, the Chief Procurator, and most legal practition-
ers. Leng, supra note 60, at 359.
70. Id. at 358-59. During the Cultural Revolution Mao Zedong called for the end of
Kung-chien-fa (public security, procuratorate, and judicial organs) and was quoted as saying:
"Depend on the rule of man, not the rule of law." Id. at 356.
71. Cohen, Will China Have a Formal Legal System?, 64 A.B.A.J. 1510, 1511 (1978).
72. China had virtually no lawyers, not even prosecutors, and most judges had little
legal training. During the previous decade, no significant legislation had been published, nor
had any law reviews or legal treatises appeared. Extrajudicial institutions played a greater
legal role than the courts in settling disputes. Judicial decisions had to be cleared with the
relevant party members (all of whom were laymen) to make certain the decisions reflected
the current "party line." Id.
Vol. 10
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oped legal system."73 China has not, however, challenged that
maxim successfully.
Uncertainty has prevailed among Chinese workers in the ab-
sence of an established legal framework.74 Arbitrary punishment
was excessively enforced against counterrevolutionaries in the
1950s and 1960s during the successive campaigns of Mao's perpet-
ual revolution.7 5 The arbitrary nature of the punishment led to an
insecurity and instability in the social order that has inhibited eco-
nomic growth.7 6 These sociological factors, coupled with Mao's ec-
onomic philosophy of "self-reliance," have combined to retard
China's economic growth and increase the discrepancy in produc-
tivity between herself and industrialized nations.
C. China's Legal Renaissance
1. Stabilization of Chinese society. In striving for the in-
creased sophistication of China, her new leaders have abandoned
Maoist legal principles. They believe that a more sophisticated le-
gal system will eliminate the past arbitrary enforcement of Chinese
law and will stabilize Chinese society.77 Relying on this stability as
the foundation, China's leaders are simultaneously abandoning
Maoist self-reliant development principles in their bold economic
plans to achieve modernization.7"
China's new leadership is currently engaged in a comprehen-
sive campaign to restore the morale, enthusiasm, and productivity
of the articulate segments of the nation, sectors whose active efforts
are essential if China is to become a modern, powerful, socialist
state.79 China's leaders realize that the intellectuals, bureaucrats,
and workers who have suffered through the successive campaigns
73. Id.
74. See Cohen, In China, as in Other Nations, People Have Rights, L.A. Times, Jan. 5,
1978, pt. VI, at I, col. 1. In the absence of written legal codes, the "law" reflected the current
"party line" of the Communist Party. What is right one day, however, may be wrong the
next day, as thousands of those purged during the Cultural Revolution found out.
75. See Cohen, supra note 71, at 1512.
76. Id.
77. Id. As China marches away from Maoism there is occurring simultaneously a reha-
bilitation of the nation's legal system. Victor Li, Stanford Law Professor, states that one
reason for China's renewed interest in jurisprudence is that "[a] group of men who were very
badly treated during [the Cultural Revolution] are back in power and they are determined
that sort of thing will never happen again." NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 1979, at 110.
78. Cohen, supra note 74.
79. Id. China's economic development depends on predictable law. Jerome Cohen
states, "If you want people to participate in the modernization movement, you must guaran-
tee them some protection against arbitrary rule. New ideas aren't going to come forth if it
pays to keep your mouth shut." NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 1979, at 110.
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against counterrevolutionaries - the anti-rightest movement, the
Cultural Revolution, and the purge of Lin Biao's followers - want
reassurance for their personal security.80 So long as fear of arbi-
trary action persists - and the Beijing media concede that such a
fear has been rampant for years - "one can hardly expect officials
to take initiatives, scientists to innovate, teachers to present new
ideas, and workers to criticize the bureaucracy."'" The current
leaders have emphasized that "the relationship between economic
development and individual rights is not an either/or proposi-
tion."82 In their view certain minimum guaranties of individual
rights are essential to promote China's economic development.83
The new constitution and the promulgation of new legal codes is
tangible evidence of the new leadership's concern with law re-
form,84 and is an attempt to stabilize Chinese society and provide
the Chinese people protection from arbitrary punishment which
has stifled innovation and growth in the past.85
Beijing may not establish the "rule of law" in a Western
sense,86 but the 1978 Constitution does provide for the exercise of
80. Cohen, supra note 74.
81. Id. Disillusioned and demoralized by years of ideological upheaval, many Chinese
bureaucrats drag their feet. As one foreign diplomat in Beijing notes, "The philosophy of
those people is not to be a tall poppy, [tihey know what happens to tall poppies." NEws-
WEEK, Oct. 15, 1979, at 86.
82. Cohen, supra note 71, at 1512.
83. The Beifing People's Daily announced an end to arbitrary justice in China. All citi-
zens were to be equal before the law. In a full-page feature on the legal system in China
indirectly criticizing the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong, the party paper said every-
one would have the right to be defended by a lawyer and that the Justice Ministry, along
with other judiciary agencies that were abolished during the Cultural Revolution, would be
reinstated. The newspaper confirmed that codes of civil law, penal law, and criminal proce-
dure were being drawn up and that law faculties were being reestablished in certain large
universities such as Futan and Shanghai. The article also recalled the right of Chinese citi-
zens to be defended by lawyers, as laid down in the new Chinese Constitution of March,
1978. L.A. Times, Dec. 7, 1978, pt. I, at 9, col. 3. The English text of the new Chinese
Constitution may be found in Hsia & Haun, People's Republic of China, III CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1978), and in 21 PEKING
REV. 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CHINA CONST.]. For a discussion of the 1978 Chinese
Constitution, see generally Kim & Kearley, The 1978 Constitution ofthe People's Republic of
China, 2 HAST. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 251 (1979).
84. Mathews, China's Legislature Enacts Ist Legal Codes, L.A. Times, July 2, 1979, pt. I,
at 5, col. 1.
85. It is significant that China is now popularizing the more positive aspects of
imperial Chinese law rather than its repressive features. All over China, on both
stage and screen, the traditional Chinese Opera Fieen Strings ofCash, banned by
Mao's widow for a decade, is again delighting audiences. It tells the dramatic story
of how an upright Manchu judicial official reverses the unjust conviction of inno-
cent persons from whom false confessions have been extracted through torture.
Cohen, supra note 71, at 1512.
86. Id. "The Chinese make no pretense of being liberal democrats. But at a time when
Vol. 10
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judicial authority by various levels of "people's courts,"8 7 to be su-
pervised by the Supreme People's Court.88 These judicial tribunals
will enforce the Constitution and the new legal codes.89 The 1978
Constitution iterates that the guiding principle of government is
party control of all state organs, including the judiciary.9" After
nearly twenty-seven years of perpetual revolution under Mao, how-
ever, the steps taken seem to be a profound attempt by China's
leaders to stabilize Chinese society.
2. Facilitation of Foreign Trade. There is an international as
well as domestic impetus to the revival of the formal indicia of legal
institutions in China. The expansion of foreign trade has necessi-
tated an increasing foreign scrutiny of the Chinese legal system.
There are certain legal issues involved in the general facilitation of
trade, relating to matters of "copyright, trademark, patent protec-
tion, insurance, contracts, forms and clauses and dispute settlement
the West fears it may be choking on law and lawyers, the East is again looking to them to
breathe a bit more freely." NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 1979, at 113.
87. Article 41 The Supreme People's Court, local people's courts at various levels
and special people's courts exercise judicial authority. The people's courts are
formed as prescribed by law.
In accordance with law, the people's courts apply the system whereby repre-
sentatives of the masses participate as assessors in administering justice. With re-
gard to major counter-revolutionary or criminal cases, the masses should be drawn
in for discussion and suggestions.
All cases in the people's courts are heard in public except those involving spe-
cial circumstances, as prescribed by law. The accused has the right to defence.
CHINA CONST. art. 41.
88. Article 42 The Supreme People's Court is the highest judicial organ. The
Supreme People's Court supervises the administration of justice by local people's
courts at various levels and by special people's courts; people's courts at the higher
levels supervise the administration ofjustice by people's courts at the lower levels.
The Supreme People's Court is responsible and accountable to the National
People's Congress and its Standing Committee. Local people's courts at various
levels are responsible and accountable to local people's congresses at the corre-
sponding levels.
CHINA CONST. art. 42.
89. Article 43 The Supreme People's Procuratorate exercises procuratorial au-
thority to ensure observance of the Constitution and the law by all the departments
under the State Council, the local organs of state at various levels, the personnel of
organs of state and the citizens. Local people's procuratorates and special people's
procuratorates exercise procuratorial authority within the limits prescribed by law.
he people's procuratorates are formed as prescribed by law.
The Supreme People's Procuratorate supervises the work of local people's
procuratorates at various levels and of special people's procuratorates; people's
procuratorates at the higher levels supervise the work of those at the lower levels.
The Supreme People's Procuratorate is responsible and accountable to the Na-
tional People's Congress and its Standing Committee. Local people's
procuratorates at various levels are respcnsible and accountable to people's con-
gresses at the corresponding levels.
CHINA CONST. art. 42.
90. See notes 87-89 supra.
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procedure." 9
The result has been a movement of legal renaissance in China.
China's "economic needs are. . . making the country more legalis-
tic . . . . [T]he Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is . . . draft-
ing investment codes, commercial laws, and tax statutes . . . [tjo
attract direct foreign investment and assure corporations overseas
that their transactions will be secure . ... "92 On July 1, 1979, the
Chinese legislature endorsed the "rule of law" by enacting the first
legal codes in Communist China in thirty years.93 Commercial
codes are being promulgated that will offer patent and trademark
protection, tax incentives for direct investment, and repatriation of
profits earned inside China.94 Small teams of Wall Street lawyers
and Hong Kong solicitors have been summoned to Beijing to help
China bring its trade laws into conformity with international prac-
tice.95 During the summer of 1979, Harvard and New York Uni-
versity Law Schools participated in tax seminars in China.96 Legal
education has been resumed, and China recently published its first
law review in years.97 As China's legal needs expand, she will need
lawyers to fill the new roles as judges, lawyers, and prosecutors, as
well as legal advisors for government enterprises such as the China
Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT).9 8
Despite Mao's previous influence, there exists in China an un-
91. R. HEUSER, FOREIGN TRADE CONTRACTS BETWEEN WEST GERMAN COMPANIES
AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: A CASE STUDY, 3, 4 (Occasional Papers/Reprints
Series in Contemporary Asian Studies No. 7, 1977).
92. Mathews, China's Laws - They Face a Revolution, L.A. Times, May 29, 1979, pt. I,
at 1, col. I (statement by Jerome A. Cohen).
93. Mathews, supra note 84. After the July 1979 party congress, the Chinese govern-
ment launched an extensive propaganda campaign to explain the new legal system. Trials
were broadcast on radio, and newspapers printed dozens of educational articles on the legal
system. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 1979, at 113.
94. Mathews, supra note 92.
95. Id.
96. Address by Jerome A. Cohen, The Standing Committee on Law and National Se-
curity and the International Law Section of the American Bar Association (June 8, 1979),
reprinted in 5 INT'L TRADE L. J. - (1980) [hereinafter cited as Cohen Address]. China is
trying to learn international legal practices. A Hong Kong firm has been consulted for help
formulating a new investment code; a young Chinese-American admiralty lawyer has been
hired as an advisor; and Harvard Law School conducted a four-week seminar on compara-
tive tax law last summer in Luda. Mathews, supra note 92.
97. Cohen Address, supra note 96.
98. Id. United States District Court Judge Irving Hill of Los Angeles, leading a delega-
tion of California jurists to China stated, "Lawyers were considered the worst of the bour-
geoisie, so during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution . . . they were scattered to the
four winds. [As a result,] China is having a tough time finding experienced counsel to staff
the [legal] system." Mathews, supra note 92.
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dercurrent running toward a more stable and regularized legal or-
der.99 It appears that the jural model is achieving parity with the
societal model and that the Chinese legal profession may regain the
respect it enjoyed in the mid-1950s.' ° The role of law in China is
undergoing a transition, moving away from its Confucian tradition
toward a philosophy more closely in line with the adversary rela-
tionship of Western legal tradition. The new constitution and law
codes and the reestablishment of a legal profession and judiciary
indicate a trend away from Confucian tradition. As the differences
in legal philosophies and practice diminish, Chinese distrust of
Western law will dissipate. The continuation of this trend would
suggest that the Chinese can be persuaded to submit to commercial
arbitration. To glean the significance of China's acquiescence, it is
imperative that we examine the origin and growth of international
commercial arbitration and the reasons for its present popularity in
the world of international business.
II. ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
A. International Acceptance of Arbitration
The innovations of twentieth century technology have fueled a
tremendous increase in international commerce. Commercial dis-
putes pose a serious obstacle to the orderly flow of this interna-
tional trade.' Commerce is inhibited if disputes are not promptly
resolved in accordance with the interests of both parties)10 2 If the
disputes are brought before courts of law, costly, lengthy, and bitter
litigation may ensue, which may destroy existing business relation-
ships.'" 3 Litigation problems are compounded by differences in
substantive and procedural law between the national legal systems
of the two parties. These problems have generated unwelcome un-
certainty in international business transactions. The primary re-
sponse to this uncertainty has been the attempt by businessmen to
achieve non-judicial solutions to their day-to-day disputes,io4
99. See Mathews, supra note 92.
100. Id.; see note 60 & 64 supra.
101. Gardner, Economic and Political Implications of International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 15, 16 (M. Domke ed. 1958).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 16-17.
104. Lubman, supra note 54, at 1287. Since the days of the "early English 'piepowder'
courts, where merchants with the dust of the market still on their feet stepped into a tribunal
of merchants for swift resolution of their disputes, businessmen have preferred arbitration, a
process which . . . combines finality of decision with speed, low expense, and flexibility"
over other forms of contract dispute settlement. Quigley, Accession By The United States To
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Today, international commercial arbitration 0 5 is the preferred
method of settling disputes arising out of international com-
merce. 10 6 The reasons for this preference are numerous. 10 7 The in-
ternational business community does not have confidence in
national courts.0 8 They are "identified with the economic, legal,
and political systems of the countries in which they are situated." 109
The United Nations Convention On The Recognition And Enforcement Of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1049 (1961). For an examination of the development of com-
mercial arbitration in England and the United States, see generally Sayre, Development of
Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928); Jones, History of CommercialArbitra-
tion in England and the United States. A Summary View, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBI-
TRATION 127 (M. Domke ed. 1958).
105. The term "international commercial arbitration" is used to refer to "any arbitration
arising out of a transaction or relationship that directly or indirectly affects international
commerce." LEW, supra note 29, at 3. For a discussion of international commercial arbitra-
tion, see generally HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (E.
Cohn, M. Domke & F. Eisemann eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Cohn & Domke]; INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION (M. Domke ed. 1958); Domke, Recent Developments in Interna-
tional CommercialArbitration, 2 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 267 (1969); Ehrenhaft, Effective
International CommercialArbitration, 9 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 1191 (1977); Henry, A Plea
for Compulsory Arbitration of International Disputes, 54 A.B.A.J. 1187 (1968); LEW, supra
note 29; Mentschikoff, The Significance ofArbitration -A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 698 (1952); Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846
(196 1) [hereinafter cited as CommercialArbitration]; McClelland, InternationalArbitration. A
Practical Guide to the System for the Litigation of Transnational Commercial Disputes, 17 VA.
J. INT'L L. 729 (1977); Reisman, Multifaceted Phenomenon of International Arbitration, 24
ARB. J. 69 (1969); SAUNDERS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1960); Straus,
Arbitration of Disputes Between Multinational Corporations, 24 ARB. J. 228 (1969); Tindall,
International CommercialArbitration, 7 AM. Bus. L.J. 65 (1969); I-V J. WETTER, THE INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRATION PROCESS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (1979).
106. Commercial arbitration provides a simple procedure before a tribunal of private
citizens who are free from the limitations of national law. See Gardner, supra note 101, at
15-17.
107. The reasons commonly given for preferring arbitration - speed of resolution of the
dispute, less expense, more expert decision, and greater privacy - are appealing to all busi-
nessmen. Id.; CommercialArbitration, supra note 105, at 850. "The desirability of arbitra-
tion among businessmen is enhanced by unpredictable conflict of laws rules ...."
Rabbino, International Commercial Arbitration and the Federal Securities Laws, 7 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POL. 383, 401 (1974).
Arbitration can be custom-tailored to suit the parties' needs and desires. There can be
maintained an atmosphere conducive to reconciliation and the maintenance of good rela-
tions between the parties. Ehrenhaft, supra note 105, at 1194.
The international businessman realizes that commercial disputes that go to courts of law
can be costly, time consuming, and bitter. Some courts and juries favor their own nationals.
In addition, there is an absence of uniform international commercial law, and courts of dif-
ferent countries have interpreted the rights and duties of buyers and sellers differently. Ro-
senthal, A Businessman Looks at Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 27, 28
(M. Domke ed. 1958); Ehrenhaft, supra note 105, at 1192.
108. LEW, supra note 29, at 1; Quigley, supra note 104, at 1049.
109. LEW, supra note 29, at 1. International commercial arbitration is a means to ensure
a uniform application of the customs and rules of the trade by the arbitrators who are experts
chosen from members of the trade to settle the dispute. Cohn & Domke, supra note 105, at v.
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By contrast, the international arbitration tribunal is the business-
man's court. Faced with such an uncertain formal legal situation, it
is natural for businessmen to react by developing substantive rules
of behavior to eliminate the unpredictability inherent in transna-
tional law suits."' Such a tribunal "exists to resolve disputes be-
tween, and in accordance with the needs of, the participants of
international commerce."l" As a result, in nearly all international
business contracts, the contracting parties have, as an alternative to
the transnational application of domestic statutes," 2 inserted a
clause calling for arbitration in the event of contractual disagree-
ments.' 13
Businessmen doing business in foreign countries have an addi-
tional reason for preferring arbitration to local judicial remedies.
Many businessmen fear discrimination, either consciously exerted
in actual bias or unconsciously exhibited by preference for local
principles of law.' To avoid this prejudice, contracting parties
have made provisions in their contracts that disputes will be settled
through arbitration "in a specified nation or by a specified impar-
tial third party.""' "Private organizations such as the American
Arbitration Association and the International Chamber of Com-
merce have developed efficient arbitral procedures and make their
services available to private parties.""' 6
Given this acceptance of arbitration as the most expeditious
method of resolving commercial disputes, a mechanism for en-
forcement of the arbitration agreements and awards becomes nec-
essary. Signatories to a United Nations convention have solved this
enforcement problem by agreeing to enforce arbitral agreements
and awards.
B. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
117
Arbitration is of real value only to the extent that "agreements
110. CommercialArbitration, supra note 105, at 850-51.
11. LEW, supra note 29, at 1.
112. When a trade group develops its own rules of law, it requires as arbiters of its dis-
putes persons who are acquainted with its standards. Because judges of formal legal systems
do not possess this knowledge, "the drive toward institutionalized private machinery is rein-
forced." Commercial Arbitration, supra note 105, at 851.
113. LEW, supra note 29, at 3.
114. Quigley, supra, note 104, at 1051.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. See generally Contini, International Corn-
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to arbitrate will be enforced against a recalcitrant party," ensuring
that what began as an arbitration will "not ultimately end up in
litigation before a court of law."' "18 Arbitration is efficient only to
the extent that specific performance of an arbitration agreement
will be ordered and that arbitral awards will receive the benefit of
summary enforcement proceedings and will not be extensively re-
viewed. '19
Under principles of private international law, enforcement of
an arbitral agreement or award is governed by the national law of
the country where enforcement is sought. 20 Absent a contrary in-
ternational agreement, international law does not impose an obli-
gation on a state to recognize and enforce an arbitral agreement
made or an award rendered abroad, nor does it prohibit a state
from discriminating against foreign agreements and awards.'
21
"States and organizations which regard this situation as undesir-
able have been instrumental in formulating conventions and uni-
form rules [to facilitate] the enforcement of arbitration agreements
and the transnational movement of arbitral awards."'
' 22
Shortly after the establishment of the United Nations, attempts
were made to formulate a multilateral solution to the problem of
enforcing foreign arbitral awards. A United Nations conference
was convened in 1958 for the conclusion of a convention on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.' 23 On
June 10, 1958, the Conference adopted the Draft Convention,
which "requires each Contracting State 'to recognize arbitral
awards as binding' and to enforce them in accordance with the
rules of procedure of the forum state."' 24 The forum state is pro-
hibited from imposing "'substantially more onerous conditions or
higher fees or charges' on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral
mercial Arbitration. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign ArbitralAwards, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283 (1959); G. HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON THE
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS (1958); Pisar, The
United Nations Convention on Foreign ArbitralAwards, 33 So. CALIF. L. REV. 14 (1959);
Quigley, supra note 104; Springer, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 INT'L LAWYER 320 (1969); Sultan, The United
Nations Arbitration Convention and United States Policy, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 807 (1959).
118. McMahon, Implementation of the UN Convention on Foreign Arbitral A wards in the
U.S., 26 ARB. J. 65, 65 (1970), reprinted in 1971 J. MAR. L. & COM. 2 (1970).
119. Id. at 65-66.
120. Id. at 66.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Quigley, supra note 104, at 1059. The legislative history of the Convention is sum-
marized in HAIGHT, supra note 117.
124. Quigley, supra note 104, at 1060, 1064-65.
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awards to which the Convention applies than it imposes on the rec-
ognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards."' 25
The United States, following the recommendation of their del-
egation to the United Nations Conference, did not initially sign the
document. 126 Interested private groups expressed considerable sup-
port for accession by the United States, and in 1968, the President
submitted the Convention to the Senate for its advice and con-
sent. 127 Accession by the United States finally occurred in 1970.128
The United States, by becoming a party to the Convention, joined
Western Europe, Japan, and most Eastern European countries, as
well as the Soviet Union, in recognizing and enforcing foreign arbi-
tral awards. 1
29
Although China allows arbitration clauses to be inserted in
commercial contracts, it is not a signatory to the Convention.
Given the acceptance of arbitration in the international business
community, 3 ° it is important to examine the characteristics of
125. Id. at 1065.
126. McMahon, supra note 118, at 67. The reasons for the delegation's recommendation
are summarized as follows:
1. The convention, if accepted on a basis that avoids conflict with State laws
and judicial procedures, will confer no meaningful advantages on the United
States.
2. The convention, if accepted on a basis that assures such advantage, will
override the arbitration laws of a substantial number of States and entail changes in
State and possibly Federal court procedures.
3. The United States lacks a sufficient domestic legal basis for acceptance of
an advanced international convention on this subject matter.
4. The convention embodies principles of arbitration law which it would not
be desirable for the United States to endorse.
Official Report of the United States Delegate to the United Nations Conference on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration 2 (Aug. 15, 1958) [hereinafter cited as U.S. DEL. REP.].
127. McMahon, supra note 118, at 67.
128. Act of July 31, 1970,9 U.S.C. § 201 (1970). See generally Aksen, American Arbitra-
tion Accession Arrives in the Age ofAquarius." United States Implements United Nations Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Arbitral Awards, 3 S.W.U.L. REV. 1
(1971); McMahon supra note 118; Comment, United Nations Foreign Arbitral A wards Con-
vention. United States Accession, 2 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 67 (1971).
129. As of January 1, 1979, signatories to the Convention include: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African
Empire, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, the Holy See,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kampuchea, Korea, Kuwait, Madagascar, Mexico, Mo-
rocco, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Af-
rica, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand,
Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and the United States. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREA-
TIES IN FORCE 240 (1979).
130. Arbitration rules were adopted by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law at its ninth session. G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Doc. A/31/71 (1976),
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China's foreign trade and her patterns of dispute settlement with
other nations.
III. FOREIGN TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT WITH CHINA
A. China and Arbitration
Politically, China is a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary molded
by the teachings of Mao Zedong, but economically, in the sense of
foreign trade, China is a pragmatist. 3 ' China employs trade prac-
tices recognized "almost in toto" by the International Chamber of
Commerce.132 It appears that China adheres to these internation-
ally accepted forms, terms, and customs, because it is a "convenient
and effective way of conducting its affairs."' 133 This implies that
China may be willing to accept international trade practices when
she believes it is in her best interest.
A typical arbitration clause found in Chinese import contracts
provides that all contract disputes are to be resolved through
friendly negotiations.134 If no settlement is reached through
friendly negotiations, the case is then submitted to the Arbitration
Committee of the CCPIT in Beijing.' 35 The decision of the Arbi-
131. Stark, An Analysis of the Foreign Trade Practices of the People's Republic of China
Including Comments on the Canadian Experience, 5 BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 165, 183 (1970).
132. Id.
133. Li, supra note 30, at 17.
134. Arbitration:
All disputes in connection with this Contract or the execution thereof shall be
settled through friendly negotiations. In case no settlement can be reached, the case
may then be submitted for arbitration to the Arbitration Committee of the China
Committee for the Promotion of International Trade in accordance with the Provi-
sional Rules of Procedures promulgated by the said Arbitration Committee. The
Arbitration shall take place in Peking and the decision of the Arbitration Commit-
tee shall be final and binding upon both parties; neither party shall seek recourse to
a law court or other authorities to appeal for revision of the decision. Arbitration
fee shall be borne by the losing party.
Contractfor Italian Export, in LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA's FOREIGN TRADE 409, app. 18
(V. Li ed. 1977).
135. Id. Stark, supra note 131, at 171-72.
The China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) established
a Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC) and a Maritime Arbitration
Commission (MAC) in 1956 and 1959 respectively ....
The FTAC administers cases of: (a) disputes arising from contracts and transac-
tions in foreign trade, including all disputes arising from foreign trade contracts or
contracts for commissioning agencies to purchase or sell merchandise: (b) disputes
arising from transportation, insurance or safekeeping of merchandise and (c) dis-
putes arising from other matters of business in foreign trade. The FTAC is com-
posed of 21 members selected and appointed by the CCPIT from among persons
aving special knowledge and experience in foreign trade, industry, agriculture,
transportation, insurance, banking and law.
The MAC administers cases of: (a) disputes regarding renumeration for salvage
services rendered by vessels to each other: (b) disputes arising from collisions be-
tween sea-going vessels: (c) disputes arising from chartering sea-going vessels, car-
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tration Committee is final and binding upon both parties.'36 The
Chinese do not feel they can receive justice under non-socialist law;
therefore, Beijing is usually stipulated as the site of all arbitration
proceedings.'37 If a particular transaction is important enough to
the Chinese government, however, a compromise on location can
be reached.1
38
Regardless of what the clauses on dispute settlement provide,
the most important aspect of Chinese practice is their determina-
riage by sea in virtue of contracts of affreightment, bills of lading or other shipping
documents, as well as disputes arising from marine insurance. The MAC is com-
posed of 31 members including experts in foreign trade, banking and insurance, as
well as experts in navigation, ships, sea-transportation and other related matters.
The FTAC and MAC have handled a fair number of cases since their establish-
ment. In 1974 for instance, they settled one case by arbitration and 12 by concilia-
tion and participated in over a hundred consultative cases.
. . . Arbitration is only adopted where the disputes cannot be settled through con-
ciliation. Thus, the combination of arbitration and conciliation is a characteristic of
China's arbitration work.
I WETTER, supra note 105, at 526-27.
136. Contract For Italian Export, supra note 134.
137. Stark, supra note 131, at 172.
138. Id. The Chinese utilize four processes for resolving commercial disputes in interna-
tional trade. The four steps are:
Step 1 - Friendly negotiation by the parties
Step 2 - Friendly negotiation with assistance of conciliators
If the parties are unable to resolve their dispute by themselves, they may re-
quest a third party to assist them to conduct their friendly negotiation. The FTAC
and MAC often perform this assisting function.
In this step, the conciliator helps the parties to reach a mutual accommodation,
but does not make specific recommendations for settlement.
Step 3 - Non-binding recommendations by conciliators
If the initial steps of friendly negotiation fail to resolve the dispute, rather than
going directly to arbitration, the parties may request the third party conciliator to
assist the friendly negotiations further by giving specific recommendations of terms
for a fair settlement of the dispute. This is an optional step and is not done in all
cases . . . . If both parties do not freely accept the recommendations, they may
proceed to arbitration.
Step 4 - Arbitration
If all other means of resolving the dispute fail or are inappropriate either party
may elect to proceed to arbitration.
I WETTER, supra note 105, at 530-32. There are four main arbitration procedures now recog-
nized by China. First, the tribunal sits in the defendant country, and when dealing with
socialist states, all members are from the defendant country's arbitration commission. Sec-
ond, with non-socialist states usually one member of the tribunal is from each country, but
sometimes all will be from the defendant state. The Chinese may permit the tribunal to be
held at the port of destination, in which case the arbitrators are appointed by each party, and
they in turn choose an umpire. Third, the arbitration will occasionally be allowed in another
socialist country if the capitalist country does not want it in China. Fourth, the tribunal may
sit in an acceptable third country, in which case local rules are not binding. See generally
Hsiao, Communist China's Foreign Trade Organization, 22 VAND. L. REV. 503, 514-18
(1969).
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tion to avoid arbitration. During a trip to Beijing in 1975, repre-
sentatives of the American Arbitration Association were told that,
during 1974, only one foreign trade contract dispute was resolved
through arbitration;139 "twelve disputes were handled by media-
tion, and more than one hundred cases were resolved through
'friendly negotiations.' "140 What is extraordinary "is that, with the
exception of some maritime matters, virtually no trade cases have
been arbitrated, in Beijing or elsewhere,"'' despite the serious dis-
putes that must have arisen in a trade totaling several billion dol-
lars a year. The Chinese would answer that all disputes were
amicably resolved by reasonable men - parties to the contract -
through friendly negotiations.
To date it has been impossible to obtain a detailed account of
any trade arbitration involving a Chinese Foreign Trade Corpora-
tion (FTC). 42  Some businessmen state that they "will never ask
for arbitration because they believe that the Chinese would con-
sider the request to be 'unfriendly,' and that the request would en-
danger future business";143 others say that "by either formally
requesting or informally hinting they were about to request arbitra-
tion, they have brought about a prompt settlement" of their dis-
pute.'" In other instances "the Chinese have been known not to
respond at all."' 145 A few traders "who have negotiated a Chinese
claim feel that in order to preserve the air of compromise they were
forced to yield . . . even when they were convinced that the [Chi-
nese] claim was groundless or exaggerated."'' 46 In addition to there
being no examples of arbitration concerning trade, there have been
no legal actions resulting from trade disputes, with the exception of
139. Torbert, The American Lawyer's Role in Trade with China, 63 A.B.A.J. 1117, 1119
(1977).
140. Id. The Chinese prefer "friendly negotiations" as a method of resolving disputes.
"An important factor in ensuring that negotiations alone will ... produce satisfactory re-
suits is that the Chinese appear to be very careful in developing relations with their trading
partners"; they try to develop trade relations slowly, preferring limited transactions in the
beginning - a feeling out process - before entering into substantial dealings. Li, supra note
30, at 13.
141. Id. at 12.
142. "[R]ecords of and legal bases for formally settled disputes are virtually inaccessible
.. Mohr, Trade with Denmark, in LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE 142,
166 (V. Li ed. 1977).
143. Lubman, Trade Between the United States and the People's Republic of China, 8 L. &
POL. INT'L Bus. 1, 46 (1976).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 47.
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some specialized Hong Kong cases.'4 7 If accomplishing nothing
else, the arbitration clause "effectively prevents a court of law from
asserting jurisdiction."' 48 While noting China's determination to
avoid arbitration, it is useful to examine the experiences of other
countries in resolving contract disputes with China.
B. Patterns of Dispute Settlement Between China and Other
Countries
1. Japan. There seem to be several levels of dispute settle-
ment under Sino-Japanese import-export agreements. The type of
procedure favored by both the Chinese and Japanese, however, is a
"mutual settlement of disputes between the parties without third-
party intervention. . . .""I This appears to be the "only practica-
ble procedure available in Sino-Japanese trade today."' 5 ° A few
contracts contain arbitration clauses, but arbitration has not been
requested by either China or Japan in the last twenty years of trad-
ing.151
2. Denmark. The history of Denmark's trade with China dif-
fers from that of most other West European countries - Denmark
recognized the government of the People's Republic of China early
in 1950.152 In general, Danish businessmen have confidence in
Chinese trading practices.' 53 As with other Western traders, how-
ever, "Danish businessmen have a basic feeling of uncertainty con-
cerning the consequences of a possible breach of contract and are
quite anxious to have the place of arbitration removed from Beijing
to one of the arbitration centers in Europe."'5 4 Like most interna-
tional businessmen, the Danish trader has a "fondness for predict-
147. Li, supra note 30, at 13.
148. Id., see Contract for Italian Export, supra note 134.
149. Henderson & Matsuo, Trade with Japan, in LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S FOR-
EIGN TRADE 28, 55 (V. Li ed. 1977).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 56.
152. Mohr, supra note 142, at 142.
153. Id. at 161.
154. Id. at 160.
Clearcut clauses like "arbitration at institution X in Zurich" occur infrequently.
Equally unusual is the "bulletproof" clause which stipulates the maximum dura-
tion of the phase of friendly negotiations, a deadline for the appointment of the
arbitrators, directions for the appointment of an arbitrator for the party who fails to
do so himself, directions for the appointment of an umpire in the event the arbitra-
tors cannot agree, place of arbitration, and a set of rules concerning arbitration
procedure, distribution of expenses, and execution of the award.
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ability."' 5 5
3. Itaoy. Most Sino-Italian contracts "include a clause calling
for arbitration by one of the arbitral tribunals in [Beijing]."' 56 In
the few exceptions, "the inclusion and wording of an arbitration
clause depends in large part on the bargaining strength of the two
sides."' 5 7 "Even when a contract contains the standard Chinese ar-
bitration clause, this clause is almost never invoked."'
' 58
The suggestion that "a dispute be submitted to arbitration...
is met with disfavor."' 5 9 Suggesting arbitration would break the
"bond of friendship and trust that underlies all [business] relations,
particularly longterm ones."' 60 The Italians have found that the
"Chinese prefer that the disputants arrive at some mutually accept-
able solution rather than seek third-party adjudication."'
16 1
4. West Germany. The "shrewd, businesslike behavior of the
Chinese trading community" is greatly admired by German trad-
ers; they "trust the Chinese and have approached trade opportuni-
ties accordingly." 162 In spite of the general amicability, there have
been disputes, some being quite serious, over contract perfor-
mance. '
6 3
"Individual contracts have been virtually the only instruments
for setting the agreed-upon conditions for exchange. "164 "The Os-
laussehuss 16  and the CCPIT did negotiate an 'unofficial' agree-
155. Id. at 166.
156. Reghizzi, Trade with Italy, in LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE 169,
183 (V. Li ed. 1977).
157. Id.
158. Id.; see note 134 supra. From 1965 through 1971, no disputes arising from Sino-
Italian trade have been submitted for arbitration. "Where disputes have arisen, the parties
attempt to resolve it themselves through an endless exchange of correspondence." Reghizzi,
supra note 156, at 183.
159. Reghizzi, supra note 156, at 184.
160. Id.
161. Id. "In order to preserve good relations the foreign trader often must give up some
apparently legitimate claim or must accept some apparently groundless Chinese claim." Id.
162. Stahnke, Trade with West Germany, in LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN
TRADE 121, 138 (V. Li ed. 1977).
163. Id. at 139.
164. Id. at 130.
165. Id. at 125.
One of the earliest and most important governmental actions with respect to
the China trade came in the early 1950's in the form of official encouragement and
even pressure on the leading German economic circles to establish an ostensibly
private body to facilitate trade with the socialist block. The organization that
emerged in 1952 was the Ostausschuss der Deutschen Wirschaft.
The formal responsibilities assumed by the Ostausschuss included: (1) provid-
ing information and advice to German firms on trading opportunities and hazards
Vol. 10
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ment which went into effect in October 1957 for a period of one
year,"' 66 but it was not renewed in 1958 and has not been renegoti-
ated since then, although it is used occasionally as the basis of con-
tract negotiations. 167
In contrast to current practice, "the 1957 agreement included
several provisions that were relatively favorable to the German
side; Zurich . . . [was] designated [as] the site for arbitration unless
otherwise agreed" to by the parties, and "detailed procedures for
arbitration were set out."' 68 "The provisions apparently reflect the
Chinese desire at that time" to enter Western markets. 69 In con-
tracts recently negotiated, a difference between Chinese and Ger-
man preferences has clearly emerged in provisions for arbitration.
The Chinese prefer Beijing as the site of arbitration, whereas the
Germans prefer "arbitration provisions as found in the 1957 agree-
ment." ' 71 "In actual cases, both extremes as well as compromises
have been written into contracts."'
17 '
Arbitration has most likely been initiated in Sino-West Ger-
man trade. Yet "the occurrence and the nature of the settlements
involved are among the best-kept secrets of their trading relation-
ship,"' 72 most likely due to the Chinese attitude regarding that kind
of dispute settlement.'73 The Chinese attempt to avoid arbitration,
preferring to make adjustments in price and specifications in the
succeeding contract. 174 According to some German businessmen,
"even if they are certain to receive the award," the Chinese prefer
with socialist countries; (2) advising the government on any matter pertaining to
Eastern trade; (3) participating in government negotiation with agents from the so-
cialist bloc on pertinent subjects; and (4) negotiating with socialist bloc counterparts
where for one reason or another the government could not. Its structure is com-
prised of a main committee (Hauptarsschuss) and six subcommittees (Arbert-
skreisen), one of which is responsible for the China trade.
Id. at 125-26.
166. Id. at 130.
167. Id. at 131.
168. Id. These are in accord with current German preferences: each party chooses an
arbitrator; the two in turn choose the third member who acts as umpire. Should one of the
parties to a dispute fail to select an arbitrator within thirty days, or should the two arbitrators
fail to agree on the choice of an umpire, the chamber of commerce at the site of arbitration
names that member of the body.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 135.
171. "One fairly common compromise, unusual in international practice, sets the place of
arbitration in Peking if the Chinese party is the plaintiff and in Stockholm or Berne if the
seller initiates the case." Id. at 136.
172. Id. at 140.
173. HEUSER, supra note 91, at 18-19.
174. Stahnke, supra note 162, at 140.
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not to arbitrate. 175
The examples given above of Chinese dispute settlements with
other countries illustrate the "no-win" situation in which Western
businessmen often find themselves. If they do not press for arbitra-
tion, they may forfeit a legitimate claim. 176 On the other hand, if
they pressure for arbitration and win, it may be "a Pyrrhic victory
- the friendly relationship upon which further dealings are based"
will probably be jeopardized.
77
The Chinese "treat their trading relationship with each state
on an individual basis, each with its unique circumstances,
problems, and opportunities."' 178 "As a result one cannot say with
much confidence what the German experience indicates regarding
. . . the possible future trading relationship of China with the
United States ... ."179 Nevertheless, Western businessmen have
remained adamant in their desire to apply arbitration to the resolu-
tion of trade disputes with China. Changes in China's political phi-
losophy following Mao Zedong's death and the realignment of
Chinese economic priorities under Deng Xiaoping may have in-
creased the possibility of China agreeing to arbitrate in the near
future.
IV. DE-MAOIFICATION AND MODERNIZATION
A. China's New Long March 80
In late 1971 or early 1972, a "decision was made to once again
emphasize the importance of foreign trade in the economic devel-
opment" of China.'' Following Chairman Mao Zedong's death
and Premier Hua Guofeng's arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976,
Deng Xiaoping was reinstated as Vice Premier. 8 2 He has been the
175. German traders have indicated that knowledge of this Chinese attitude toward
arbitration is a real advantage, especially if the contract in question calls for arbi-
tration in Stockholm or Zurich. They can threaten to seek settlement by arbitration
if they are the partner making a claim, or they can negotiate on a Chinese claim
knowing that they are not apt to be taken before an arbitration commission them-
selves.
Id.
176. Reghizzi, supra note 156, at 184.
177. Id. at 185.
178. Stahnke, supra note 162, at 141.
179. Id.
180. The Beyiing People's Daily applauded the modernization drive: "We are setting out
to conquer on our New Long March the mountains, seas, plains, oilfields and mines of our
motherland. We want to scale the heights of science and technology. We want to develop
normal trade relations with other countries of the world." TIME, Jan. I, 1979, at 13.
181. Li, supra note 30, at 7.
182. The Gang of four includes Mao's widow Jiang Qing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao
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driving force behind China's ambitious development scheme to ex-
tricate China from poverty and transform it into a major economic
and military power. 8 3 Beijing's current emphasis on economics
over politics, on facts over revolutionary rhetoric, and on cash bo-
nuses over inspirational speeches flows from Deng's vision.184 It is
difficult for Westerners to understand how so vast a population can
psychologically reverse itself so quickly; the Chinese, however, in-
stinctively believe that life constantly swings between extremes -
that the rule is always change, reversal.
85
In their drive for modernization, Chinese leaders have pro-
ceeded by "subtle indirection to prepare the masses for de-Maoifi-
cation."' 86 They are attempting the delicate task of "desanctifying
Mao's memory"'' 87 without "besmirching it completely."'' 88  They
are discarding much of his old ideology8 9 - in particular, the once
sacred Maoist principle of national self-reliance and independence
from outside resources. 190
Having abandoned the philosophy of self-reliance, Chinese
leaders face the problem of financing their modernization drive.
China has announced that it will seek billions of dollars in foreign
Wen-yuan, and Wang Hung-wen. Shirk, Human Rights.- What About China, 29 FOREIGN
POL. 109, 111-12 (1977-1978). Deng commands a broad power base among the senior of-
ficers of the People's Liberation Army as well as wide support among China's technocrats
and intellectuals. Mathews, Visit Caps Emergence oChina, Teng, L.A. Times, Jan. 28, 1979,
pt. I, at I, col. 4.
183. Mathews, supra note 182.
184. Id. See note 19 supra, and accompanying text.
185. TIME, Jan. 1, 1979, at 16.
186. Id. at 17. Deng has systematically dismantled many of Mao's pet projects, removed
the Maoist quotations from the front page of the Beiying People's Daily and spearheaded a
media drive to cut the great helmsmen to mortal size. "Democracy Wall" in Tien An Mien
Square in Beijing has even seen Mao be the victim of criticism of the wall poster campaign.
Mathews, supra note 182.
187. Mathews, supra note 182. It is an attempt to end the cult of personality that Mao
encouraged about himself.
188. They assert that Mao's philosophy was basically correct, but that it was distorted
and misapplied by his onetime heir apparent Lin Biao, and by the Gang of Four, led by
Mao's widow Jiang Qing. TIME, Jan. 1, 1979, at 17.
189. All that remains of the Maoist legacy are the agricultural communes and China's
staunchly anti-Soviet foreign policy. Deng has tinkered with every other aspect of Chinese
life. Mathews, Modernizing China.: Teng's Daring Drive, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1979, pt. I, at 1,
col. 1.
190. TIME, Jan. 1, 1979, at 13. 1978 was an extraordinary year for Chinese foreign trade.
In February, 1978, Japan and China signed a private trade agreement worth $20 billion,
whereby China would export oil to Japan in exchange for Japanese steel and factories. In
December, 1978, China and France signed a seven-year, $13.5 billion cooperation agree-
ment. Id. at 14.
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credit 9 ' and has disclosed a decision "to conform to international
trade practices."' 92 The Chinese are willing for the first time to
accept government-to-government loans, to borrow from such
agencies as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and
to permit direct foreign investment on Chinese soil. 1 3 American
companies will soon be able to enter into joint ventures with
China's quasi-governmental trade corporations. 194
A consequence of China's emergence into the international ec-
onomic system has been the rapid growth of Sino-United States
trade. Even before President Carter's decision to recognize the
Beijing government, Chinese analysts estimated that trade might
triple in 1979 due to major Chinese purchases of American grain,
oil rigs, hotels, and industrial plants. 95 In 1978, business between
the United States and China exceeded the billion dollar level for
the first time, a total three times the 1977 level. 196 Now that nor-
malization of relations has occurred, the United States finds itself
on equal footing with the trading competition - Western Europe
and Japan. 19 Moreover, Deng Xiaoping's trip to the United States
should result in a steady increase in Sino-United States trade in the
years ahead.
Chinese leaders seem to be attempting to completely redefine
China's approach to the rest of the world. 98 A country that has
traditionally regarded foreigners as barbarians now opens its gates
to the outside world - last year, 530,000 tourists visited China, as
did thousands of foreign businessmen looking for new markets and
investments. '99
191. Mathews, Ready to Welcome U.S. Companies, Peking Says, L.A. Times, Dec. 19,
1978, pt. I, at I, col. 2.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Birenbaum, Doing Business in China, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1979, at 6, col. 4.
195. In November 1978 alone, China concluded contracts worth $1.5 billion, with many
of the deliveries scheduled for 1979. Mathews, supra note 191.
196. Several multi-million dollar contracts have been signed between American corpora-
tions and China. Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1978, at 16, col. 3. U.S. Steel Corporation has con-
cluded an agreement to build a $1 billion iron-ore processing complex in northern China
that could boost Chinese steel production by 25%. Mathews, U.S. Steel Will Build SI Billion
Plant in China, L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1979, pt . I, at 1, col. 6.
197. China's policy during the long impasse over normalization was to award contracts
to Japanese or European firms rather than American firms if the sales price and other terms
were roughly the same. With normalization completed, American firms will, in the future,
be operating on equal footing.
198. The two most startling pieces of symbolic revisionism: the Chinese are planning to
construct a golf course on the outskirts of Beijing and have given Coca-Cola exclusive rights
to sell in China. TIME, Jan. I, 1979, at 13.
199. Id. John K. Fairbank states that the "traditional Chinese policy of 'use barbarians
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B. Readjustment to the Realities of Modernization
China is presently reassessing its modernization drive and re-
ducing some of its overambitious economic goals.2" This retrench-
ment reflects the influence of Chen Yun, the latest addition to the
Politburo's six-man Standing Committee.20 ' Chen believes that
well-planned economic growth cannot sustain break-neck develop-
ment, his philosophy being that China "cannot afford to jump, [but]
must [proceed] step by step" in its drive toward modernization. 0 2
Most foreign economists view the reassessment as a welcome
sign.23 Few expect China to reverse itself or to abandon moderni-
zation; Chinese leaders are merely reacting to a complex array of
problems that has made it necessary to adjust their development
policies to the realities of modernization. 2 ' Consider five of sev-
eral factors that have played a role in China's decision.
1. Socioeconomic Considerations. An important sociological
factor to consider is the impact of modernization on the Chinese
people. The initial investment in heavy industry diverted resources
from being applied toward improving the standard of living for
to control barbarians' is still operating ...." Holley, Scholar Sees Continuing China Insta-
bility, L.A. Times, March 31, 1979, pt. I, at 10, col. I.
200. Mathews & Holley, China Puts Brakes on Modernization Drive, L.A. Times, March
18, 1979, pt. I, at I, col. 5. In his address to the National People's Congress, Chinese Premier
Hua Guofeng conceded that China's modernization program was too ambitious. His wide-
ranging report disclosed Chinese economic progress for the preceding year, reflecting a new
candor in Beijing regarding disclosures of economic statistics. Mathews, Hua Admits Error
on Modernization, L.A. Times, June 19, 1979, pt. I, at 10, col. I.
201. Chen, an economic expert, supervised China's economic recovery following the
Civil War, before falling out of favor with Chinese leadership shortly before Mao's disas-
trous Great Leap Forward. Mathews, Layoffs Seen in China Slowdown, L.A. Times, May 31,
1979, pt. I, at 1, col. 4; Holley, Chen. From Pariah to Prophet, L.A. Times, June 21, 1979, pt.
I, at 19, col. I. The Great Leap Forward was Mao's development strategy designed to accel-
erate economic growth and socialist transformation by stressing the mass line approach (a
fundamental principle of leadership requiring party cadres to be integrated with the masses
and to lead the masses in implementing party policy) and the simultaneous development of
agriculture and industry and of indigenous (labor intensive) and modern (capital intensive)
projects. See generally J. PRYBYLA, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST CHINA 256-
340 (1970).
202. Soon after Chen's reemergence, China served notice that it was reassessing its devel-
opment plans. In a flurry of action, Beijing suspended $3 billion in contracts with Japan,
backed off its previous commitment to double steel production by 1985, and warned foreign
businessmen that major new transactions might be postponed until the end of the year. Ma-
thews, supra note 201.
203. Mathews & Holley, supra note 200.
204. Foreign economists considered the majority of Hua Guofeng's modernization goals
unattainable. By committing itself to an annual growth rate of 4% in grain production and
more than 10% in industry, China's goals exceeded her capabilities; no major power on earth
has ever been able to sustain such consistently high growth rates. Id.
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China's 800 million peasants, who desperately want a better life.20 5
The demands of China's peasants place a limit on the speed at
which modernization can be accomplished.20 6 A related problem is
providing material incentives to motivate the work force without
creating an uncontrollable urge for consumer goods.20 7 China's
leaders have promised a better life for the ordinary Chinese. These
promises, combined with the rising expectations of the people,
which have been magnified by television glimpses of life outside
China, produced expectations the Chinese leadership realized they
could not meet.20 8
Another problem facing the Chinese is the shortage of edu-
cated managers, bureaucrats, scientists, and engineers. 20 9 The
chaos of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution and
the resulting decade of upheaval in universities and bureaucracy
has left China almost totally depleted of managerial and profes-
sional skills.210 This dearth of talent is acutely felt in China to-
day. 21 ' The Cultural Revolution virtually destroyed the Chinese
economic system, and Chinese leadership is presently in the process
of formulating an integrated economic plan.21 2
In the past there has not been internal agreement on economic
strategy in areas that necessitate decisions based upon economic
analysis rather than political pronouncements. 2 1 3 Management
needs to be put back in control 4.2 1  China's capacity to absorb tech-
nology is also a factor that dictates the rate of modernization. So-
phisticated machinery does China little good if the Chinese are
insufficiently trained to operate the machines. This is the situation
prevalent today.215 China desperately needs trained workers - ed-
ucated masses to utilize the tools she is buying - and concurrently
she needs people trained in economic management and planning,
205. See Holley, supra note 199.
206. Id.
207. Address by William C. Clarke, The Standing Committee on Law and National Se-
curity and the International Law Section of the American Bar Association (June 9, 1979),
reprinted in 5 INT'L TRADE L.J. - (1980) [hereinafter cited as Clarke Address].
208. Mathews & Holley, supra note 200.
209. Clarke Address, supra note 207.
210. MNCs Believe China Trade Setback is Temporary, MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS 43,44
(No. 2, 1979) [hereinafter cited as MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS].
211. Address by Jan S. Prybyla, The Standing Committee on Law and National Security
and the International Law Section of the American Bar Association (June 8, 1979), reprinted
in 5 INT'L TRADE L.J. - (1980) [hereinafter cited as Prybyla Address].
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Clarke, supra note 207.
215. Prybyla, supra note 211.
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who must be given control.216
2. Bottlenecks in the Economy. In China, even the most basic
infrastructure - electricity - cannot be assumed to be ade-
quate.217 The newly constructed Wuhan Iron and Steel Works con-
sumes so much electricity that power to other factories within the
city often has to be suspended. 218 There is insufficient electrical
power in all of Hubei province to keep the facility operating at full
capacity, an example of one of the fundamental problems facing
Chinese industry - an acute shortage of electric power and raw
materials. 219 These shortages create bottlenecks in the economy,
which retard economic growth; it is senseless to invest in areas of
the economy whose growth will be retarded by these circumstances.
Rather, China must concentrate on eradicating these bottlenecks to
ensure steady economic growth - infrastructure investment is es-
sential.220 The purpose of China's retrenchment is to make better
use of her scarce resources 22I to eliminate these problem areas.
3. Military Modernization. Although China has joined the
nuclear club, her military establishment lags far behind those of the
Soviet Union and the United States.222 China's recent military con-
frontation with Vietnam provided her with poignant evidence that
her military machine was archaic and in need of a commitment of
capital to upgrade her defensive capacity.223
4. Financing the Modernization Drive. China's financial con-
siderations in her modernization drive can be summarized as "an
overestimation of expected revenue from oil and an underestima-
tion of the effects of modernization expenditures. '"224 Because
China's oil has a heavy wax content, harnessing the resource will
entail an enormous investment.225
Many businessmen were unnerved by the frantic pace at which
216. Id.
217. MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS, supra note 210, at 44.
218. Mathews, supra note 201.
219. Id.; Clarke Address, supra note 207.
220. MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS, supra note 210, at 46.
221. Mathews, supra note 201.
222. See NEWSWEEK, March 5, 1979, at 26-32. A Chinese military official recently de-
clared that China was "at least twenty years behind the Americans and the Soviets in weap-
onry." Mathews, supra note 189.
223. Clarke Address, supra note 207.
224. Id.
225. Prybyla Address, supra note 211.
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China was purchasing foreign commodities. 226 Presently, the Chi-
nese have plenty of cash; they are determining how to finance fu-
ture purchases before they exhaust their cash supply, what any
good businessman would do. 227 Internationally, China is viewed as
a good credit risk; she has an excellent record for paying debts. It is
estimated China will have accumulated $20 billion in credit by
1985.228
5. Political Stability. A final concern is the political stability
of China in view of the strains and pressures caused by moderniza-
tion. Chinese leaders are aware of the "zig-zag" nature of China's
history229 and realize that the demands of China's peasants not
only place a limit on China's modernization program but create
pressures for a zag in policy.23° Although China's modernization
differs greatly from what occurred in Iran, Chinese leaders are still
aware of the potential dangers of moving too fast, too quickly, cre-
ating a sociological strain on the populace.23 t
It is important to realize that China's slowdown merely reflects
a readjustment, on her part, to reality. The previous year's pace of
growth was unrealistic. The United States media somewhat exag-
226. Mathews & Holley, supra note 200. The pace of China's buying would have quickly
depleted China's cash reserves. Her primary sources of income are oil, which is requiring an
enormous investment to recover, and textiles, which are "import sensitive" in the West and
therefore of limited potential. Prybyla Address, supra note 211.
227. Mathews & Holley, supra note 200.
228. Prybyla Address, supra note 211.
229. Holley, supra note 199. During exceptional times, political and ideological consid-
erations have influenced China's commercial relations. In 1964, Vickers-Zimmer, Ltd., a
British firm, signed a contract with the China National Technical Import Corporation to set
up a petro-chemical plant in China. Although the contract provided for arbitration, in
Stockholm, of disputes, a Chinese people's court in July 1968 annulled the contract and
ordered Vickers-Zimmer, Ltd., to pay an indemnity of £650,000 to the Chinese for "eco-
nomic losses." According to the court, Vickers-Zimmer, Ltd., had no intention of fulfilling
the contract and had been deliberately perpetrating a fraud. The case must be viewed in its
context - it occurred during the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution - but the
incident is evidence that China has, on occasion, turned xenophobic and chaotic. Torbert,
The American Lawyer's Role in Trade with China, 63 A.B.A.J. 1117, 1120 (1977).
230. Holley, supra note 199. Aware that Chinese domestic politics have gone through
alternating periods of moderation and radicalism, Deng Xiaoping has cleverly anticipated
this problem. He is designing traps for any neo-Maoists who might wish to renege on the
commitment to modernization and attempt to return China to insularity. If the current trend
continues for a decade, it will be very difficult for China to extricate herself from her posi-
tion. China will have commitments to foreign creditors that will force her to continue pro-
moting exports and internal economic development. Tens of thousands of returning Chinese
students who have been exposed to foreign ideas will resist any return to xenophobia and
Romantic Maoism. Also, there may be a military unable to function without parts and tech-
nology from Hamburg or Los Angeles. TIME, Jan. I, 1979, at 20.
231. Cohen Address, supra note 96.
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gerated China's growth potential following normalization, and
much written lately has exaggerated the severity of China's re-
trenchment. In both instances the truth lies somewhere in the mid-
dle.232 In the long run, there is enormous potential for economic
cooperation between China and the United States.233 The Chinese
market should be viewed as one of "measured optimism" with tre-
mendous growth potential.234
C Reordering Chinese Priorities
As a result of Chen Yun's counsel, China is shifting the em-
phasis of her modernization drive away from capital-intensive
fields such as steel, "toward light industries that can produce con-
sumer goods for both export and domestic consumption. "235 China
will be placing emphasis on developing hydroelectric power, ac-
quiring agricultural equipment to increase food production, and
improving the transportation and communication sectors of the
economy.236
The Beijing government, in a series of economic reports, re-
cently disclosed economic matters long classified as state secrets.23 7
To date, China has joined very few international economic or
financial organizations, 238 but there is speculation that the Chinese
are placing their financial house in order, because they wish to join
the International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank, and
the World Bank to acquire credit - all these institutions demand
full financial accounting.239
China remains committed to foreign commerce. Although
232. Clarke Address, supra note 207.
233. Holley, supra note 199.
234. Clarke Address, supra note 207. It is important to view Sino-United States trade
with foresight, to avoid focusing myopically on the immediate commercial possibilities of the
next few years and view the relationship within the context of a long-term association - a
market that will steadily expand.
235. Mathews, supra note 201. Having scaled down plans for rapidly developing a heavy
industrial base, China is eager to invest her limited capital in light industries such as bicycles
and transistor radios - consumer items that will be dependable exports earning foreign
exchange and that can be marketed domestically to provide consumer items for her people.
NEWSWEEK, May 28, 1979, at 72.
236. Clarke Address, supra note 207.
237. What emerges from these economic revelations is startling. China is third in the
world in coal production, fifth in steel production, and among the top ten in crude oil pro-
duction. The figures also revealed the distance China must travel to realize its goals of be-
coming an industrial power. The size of China's budget underscores her poverty. Last year,
$71 billion was spent by Beijing - less than that spent by HEW. Mathews, China Bares its
Economic Facts of Lfe, L.A. Times, July 23, 1979, pt. I, at 1, col. 1.
238. INDUS. & TRADE AD., supra note 7, at 1.
239. Mathews, supra note 237.
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Beijing has decided to halt the spending spree of 1978 to use its
limited revenues to update existing plants and machinery rather
than buy entire factories, the 1979 budget still calls for China's for-
eign transactions to be approximately $27.5 billion, a twenty-four
percent increase over 1978.240
The National People's Congress underlined China's commit-
ment to economic growth by recently promoting three economists
to the top ranks of government.2 4 1 Hua Guofeng's concurrent ad-
dress to the Congress indicated that China would "retrench for
three years, slow new construction and lower its targets before re-
suming the modernization drive at full speed. ' 242 China needs for-
eign contributions to its economic modernization plan;2 43 therefore,
foreign trade is a necessity.
V. ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO TRADE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Settlement of the Frozen Assets-Blocked Claims Dispute
The frozen assets-blocked claims dispute dates from 1950,
when President Truman responded to China's entry into the
Korean War by freezing $80.5 million in Chinese assets - mostly
bank accounts and securities - located in the United States. 2"
Beijing retaliated by seizing American property in China valued at
$196 million.245  Former United States Commerce Secretary
Juanita M. Kreps and Chinese Finance Minister Zhang Jingfu
signed an agreement, May 11, 1979, settling the long-standing dis-
pute, removing the major obstacle to the signing of a Sino-United
States trade agreement.246 The settlement of the property dispute
clears the way for closer commercial, banking, maritime, and avia-
tion ties between the two countries.247
240. Beijing's interest in acquiring foreign capital was demonstrated by the National
People's Congress endorsement of a foreign investment code requiring foreign partners in
joint ventures to take at least 25% interest. Mathews, supra note 84.
241. The three, elected to China's State Council, were critics of Mao's economic theories
and were purged during the Cultural Revolution. Id.
242. Id.
243. MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS, supra note 210, at 46.
244. Mathews, U.S., China Property Pact Clears Wayfor New Ties, L.A. Times, May 12,
1979, pt. II1, at 13, col. 4.
245. Id.
246. The agreement calls for the Chinese to retain the American property confiscated in
China and pay the United States $80.5 million in annual installments over the next five
years. Washington will, in return, unfreeze the Chinese assets under its control, making it
possible for Beijing to recover them. Because of the gap between claims and assets, the 384
American claimants will be reimbursed at the rate of 41; on the dollar. Id.
247. Because any American citizen or corporation with a claim against China could at-
tach Chinese property entering the United States, the assets-claims problem prevented China
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B. The Sino- United States Trade Agreement24 8
On July 7, 1979, a comprehensive trade agreement was signed
by China and the United States. 249 The pact runs for three years
and is automatically renewed unless renounced by China or the
United States.2 -s  The Accord, if endorsed by Congress, would pro-
vide the most-favored-nation treatment long sought by the Chi-
nese.
2 51
Under the terms of the 1974 Foreign Trade Act, Congressional
approval in both houses is mandatory before the agreement can go
into effect. 25 2 Most-favored-nation status hinges on the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment, which states that any Communist country
granted most-favored-nation status must give assurance of free em-
igration.253 President Carter has received assurances from the Beij-
ing government that it will conform to the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment, and he has indicated a willingness to waive the free-
migration requirement.254
The Sino-United States Trade Agreement was negotiated to
provide a framework for future trading relations. The agreement
will reduce the steep tariffs levied against Chinese exports to the
United States, 255 allow American corporations and banks to estab-
lish offices in China,256 and pave the way for low-interest United
from holding trade exhibitions in American cities or carrying on full banking relations with
United States banks. Id.
248. The Sino-U.S. Trade Agreement, July 7, 1979, reprinted in CHINA Bus. REV., July-
Aug. 1979, at 24-26 [hereinafter cited as Trade Agreement].
249. U.S and China Sign Trade Agreement, L.A. Times, July 8, 1979, pt. I, at 6, col. 1;
Trade Agreement, supra note 248, at 24.
250. Trade Agreement, supra note 248, art. X.
251. Id. art. II. Most-favored-nation status would reduce the high tariff barriers against
Chinese goods, enabling China to export products to the United States more cheaply than
before. Tariffs would drop from an average of 24% to 5.5%. U.S. and China sign Trade
Agreement, supra note 249.
252. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1974).
253. Id. § 2432.
254. Mathews, U.S., China Conclude Trade Pact, L.A. Times, May 15, 1979, pt. IV, at 1,
col. 6. The Trade Act of 1974 gives the Chief Executive authority to make such exceptions, if
there is evidence that a country is moving toward a freer policy. Trade Act of 1974, 19
U.S.C. § 2432(2) (1974).
State Department sources feel that granting China most-favored-nation status could
have serious implications for United States-Soviet relations, including the recently signed
SALT II Treaty. Washington has refused to give most-favored-nation status to the Soviet
Union, because Moscow has refused to provide assurances it will permit free emigration.
President Carter's decision to sign the trade pact with China contradicts his previous policy
of dealing evenhandedly with China and the Soviet Union. San Diego Union, July 8, 1979,
§ A, at i, col. 3.
255. Trade Agreement, supra note 248, art. II.
256. Id. art. III.
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States Export-Import Bank credits to China.2 57 The pact spells out
procedures for customs, 25 8 provisions regarding international pay-
ments, 259 patents, trademarks and copyrights, 260 resolution of bilat-
eral trade problems, 26' and endorses nonjudicial procedures -
including third-country arbitration - for the prompt settlement of
commercial disputes.2 6 2 The trade agreement is expected to pro-
vide an impetus to the development of bilateral economic trade -
in fact, American officials estimate that under the three-year pact,
annual Sino-United States trade could double its 1978 total of $1.1
billion.263
C China's New Law on Joint Ventures
China has reduced its foreign purchases, in part, because of a
257. Id. art. V.
258. Id. art. II.
259. Id. art. V.
260. Id. art. VI.
261. Id. art. VII.
262. Id. art. VIII.
1. The Contracting Parties encourage the prompt and equitable settlement of
any disputes arising from or in relation to contracts between their respective firms,
companies and corporations, and trading organizations, through friendly consulta-
tions, conciliation or other mutually acceptable means.
2. If such disputes cannot be settled promptly by any one of the above-men-
tioned means, the parties to the dispute may have recourse to arbitration for settle-
ment in accordance with provisions specified in their contracts or other agreements
to submit to arbitration. Such arbitration may be conducted by an arbitration insti-
tution in the People's Republic of China, the United States of America, or a third
country. The arbitration rules of procedure of the relevant arbitration institution
are applicable, and the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law recommended by the United Nations, or other international ar-
bitration rules, may also be used where acceptable to the parties to the dispute and
to the arbitration institution.
3. Each Contracting Party shall seek to ensure that arbitration awards are
recognized and enforced by their competent authorities where enforcement is
sought, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.
Id. (emphasis added). Although the Trade Agreement provides that the parties "shall seek
to ensure" enforcement of arbitral awards, it provides no detailed enforcement mechanism.
Enforcement of a Chinese arbitration award thus presents some interesting legal issues.
China is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Arbitral Awards. "It is hoped, however, that in the process of modernizing its commercial
laws, [China] will sign the United Nations Convention." Existent Chinese law does not pro-
vide for judicial enforcement of an arbitral award. The Chinese do have a reputation for
"adhering strictly" to their contractual obligations. "Therefore, parties negotiating contracts
with [China] may find it helpful to include a clause about the enforcement of arbitral awards
in their contracts and joint venture agreements." Surrey & Soble, Joint Venture Law and
Dispute Resolution In China- A Framework For International Trade, I EAST ASIAN EXECU-
TIVE REP. 3, 16 (Sept. 1979).
263. San Diego Union, July 8, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 3. William C. Clarke, former Director
of the Commerce Department's China division reported that more than $500 million in
goods changed hands during the first quarter of 1979 and that two-way trade should top $2
billion by the end of 1979. The trade agreement is expected to boost two-way trade to $5
billion-$7 billion a year by 1985. Mathews, supra note 254.
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shortage of capital. They remain, however, anxious to acquire for-
eign technology to modernize, and they have intensified their
search for foreign investment by encouraging foreign firms to enter
into joint ventures.264 In an attempt to ease the anxiety of potential
foreign investors, China recently adopted a new law on joint ven-
tures.265 The new law states a minimum of twenty-five percent for
foreign investment in a joint venture; the law does not, however, set
a maximum share that can be held by foreign investors.266 There is
an indication, however, that Beijing is prepared to consider one
hundred percent foreign ownership of joint ventures in China.267
The joint venture law states that legal protection is to be given
to foreign investments and that profits, risks, and losses will be
shared in proportion to each side's investment.268 In addition, in
the event disputes arise that cannot be settled through mutual con-
sultation, the joint venture law provides that the disagreements may
be resolved through arbitration by an arbitral body "agreed on by the
parties.' 269 Chinese legal experts are busy working out the regula-
tions to support the joint venture code, 27° as China continues as
rapidly as possible to draw up new codes to cover foreign invest-
ment, taxation, and commercial law.27'
China's foreign investment law points to a China self-confi-
dent enough to accept foreign investment. 2  Ironically, China's
prolonged isolation may be a factor facilitating the present com-
264. Butterfield, China May Let Foreigners Own Plants, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1979, at 29,
col. 3; Wall St. J., July 9, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
265. China's National People's Congress adopted a new "Law on Joint Ventures," July
1, 1979. Wall St. J., July 9, 1979, at 6, col. 1. For a discussion of the possibilities the new law
may present, see Birenbaum, supra note 194.
266. Wall St. J., July 9, 1979, at 6, col. I; Birenbaum, supra note 194.
267. Professor Cohen stressed that details of the plan were still being worked out. He
said the plan would probably include a provision that the facilities would eventually, in ten
to twenty years, revert to China. Butterfield, supra note 264.
268. Wall St. J., July 9, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
269. Liu, Toning down the Spirit, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., July 27, 1979, at 83-84;
Wall St. J., July 9, 1979, at 6, col. I (emphasis added). "For purposes of dispute resolution,
[the Trade Agreement] ...is broader than the language of the Law on Joint Ventures."
When negotiating dispute resolution clauses in contracts with China, it will be useful to be
aware of "the distinctions between the Trade Agreement and the Law on Joint Ventures."
For a discussion of these distinctions in dispute resolution, see Surrey & Soble, supra note
262, at 16.
270. Kulkarni, China-traders await details on ventures law, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 6,
1979, at 13, col. 1.
271. Butterfield, supra note 264. John Kamm, Hong Kong representative for the Na-
tional Council on United States China Trade, states, "I don't think any American firm will
enter into a true joint venture with China until there are some laws on the books ..
Mathews, supra note 92.
272. Birenbaum, supra note 194.
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mercial dialogue. China, unlike other developing countries, has no
current legacy of grievances against multinational corporations.
The new joint venture law suggests growing promise for the future
of Sino-United States commercial relations.
273
VI. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S METAMORPHOSIS
A reevaluation of China's participation in commercial arbitra-
tion is necessary in light of the extraordinary turn of events follow-
ing Mao Zedong's death. Like the seasons that change into their
opposite with little regard for consistency, China is being trans-
formed into a mirror image of its former self, yesterday's heresies
have become today's orthodoxies.274 China's predominately antile-
gal domestic orientation has ceased. 275 The new leadership, con-
cerned with legal reform, has replaced Mao's arbitrary,
deformalized legal system with a new constitution and is promul-
gating new written codes of law.276 The isolationist economic prin-
ciples of self-reliance have been replaced by a bold, outward-
looking program under which technology will be imported to speed
China's transformation into a world power.277 The ideological fer-
vor of Mao Zedong has been replaced by the pragmatic moderation
of Deng Xiaoping, and an outward looking China has inextricably
joined the world business community.278 China appears willing to
free economics from the restraint of politics. 279 This reflects a de-
sire to seek a more moderate approach to internal development, a
willingness to compromise ideological purity and economic growth
in the resolution of China's glaring deficiencies.280
China is overcoming her distrust of law. She is using law as an
instrument to ossify Chinese society and as a means to facilitate
foreign trade and encourage foreign investment. China has ac-
273. Id. The China International Trust and Investment Corporation announced in Sep-
tember, 1979, that it had signed China's initial joint-venture agreement with E-S Pacific Cor-
poration to invest $150 million in a number of projects. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 1979, at 113.
274. Schell, Confessions of an Unreconstructed Capitalist Roader, L.A. Times, Feb. 4,
1979, pt. VI, at 2, col. 1.
275. See Cohen, supra note 71, at 1512.
276. Cohen, supra note 74.
277. TIME, Jan. 1, 1979, at 17.
278. Id.
279. L.A. Times, Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, at 14, col. 4.
280. So eager is China for managerial expertise that the party is willing to coax former
capitalists, once the most reviled class in the country, back into service. In January, 1979,
Beijing announced that property and bank accounts seized from industrialists and shopkeep-
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cepted these changes, because they were necessary prerequisites to
the accomplishment of her long-term development goals.
China's realignment of priorities in her push to modernize has
increased the possibility she will submit to arbitration. As Chinese
economic philosophy adopts a more pragmatic perspective and as
the Chinese increase foreign trade, the cultural, historical, and ide-
ological factors fueling their reluctance to arbitrate will subside.
There has been a revival of the formal indicia of legal institutions
in China. To eliminate the remaining historical distrust and linger-
ing cultural reluctance, first must come understanding. The road to
understanding lies in the exposure to, and education of, the Chinese
in the practices and procedures of international commercial arbi-
tration. Chinese trade officials have expressed interest in learning
about American institutions for trade dispute settlement. 28' The
Legal Affairs Director of the CCPIT has indicated the Council
might be prepared to consider sending representatives to study ar-
bitration in the United States. 282 Such an exchange would be inval-
uable in tempering China's remaining distrust of arbitration. A
catayst must, however, be provided to initiate China's acceptance
and participation in arbitration. An invitation should be extended
through the American Arbitration Association or the American
Chamber of Commerce to Chinese authorities, inviting them to ob-
serve commercial arbitration in the United States. Chinese obser-
vation of arbitration techniques and procedures will help dispel
their remaining uncertainties and demonstrate the benefits of arbi-
tration. It is reasonable to assume that the Chinese, as they escape
having to justify economic decisions in light of a narrow "party
line," will view trade from a businessman's perspective, and the
practical advantages to arbitration will become increasingly appar-
ent. They then will come to appreciate and trust this efficient busi-
nessman's solution to commercial disputes. China's participation
in arbitration is a logical extension of her new economic, political,
and legal philosophies and her increased participation in the inter-
national business community. More than ever, participation in ar-
bitration is in China's best interest and will assist her in achieving
her goal of becoming a modern nation by the year 2000.
George Burke Hinman
281. Lubman, supra note 1, at 236.
282. The director stated that exchanges "are under consideration" and suggested "pur-
suit of the idea through correspondence." Ginsburg, American Bar Association Delegation
Visits the People's Republic of China, 64 A.B.A.J. 1516, 1518 (1978).
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